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empirical justification for the belief that all the
languages of the world share every one of them"
(p. 90). It is not clear in what sense we should
understand Hockett's account to be a definition of
"language." But even if we assume that Hockett is
claiming that it is an analytic truth that language has
the thirteen design features, it is surely contingent that
humans are the only beings that use language. H a chimp
or a nonhuman alien were to employ a communication
system that exhibited all thirteen design features,
Hockett could claim, without conceptual confusion, that
the chimp or alien spoke language. Hockett's view
neither asserts nor implies that language is by defmition
the exclusive province of humans.
Contrary to Sheets-Johnstone' s view, I think Hockett
(1960) does provide an historical account of the origin
of human language: he describes the order in which the
"design features" ofhuman language may have evolved
and sketches some potential reasons for their evolution
without straying noticeably from the strictures of
evolutionary theory. Hockett's model may lack rigor
and detail; it may be speculative and passe; it may make
bad assumptions, and it may be false. I'm willing to be
convinced that it's all this and more. But it doesn't
imply that language issued magically from the mouths
of our ancestors.
Sheets-Johnstone's attack against Hockett's model
seems particularly harsh, given the difficulties involved
in constructing an account of the origins of human
language. Consider that the language of our early
ancestors left no explicit fossil records and written
language arose long after spoken language was well on
its way. Given the paucity of evidence at our disposal,
how can we hope to develop an account of the origin of
human language that is something other than a fairy
tale? Here is Hockett's plausible method: We assume
that the communication systems of our ancestors were
similar to those of certain extant nonhuman animals.
We then compare their communication systems with
our own in order to determine what sorts of changes
had to have occurred in order for human language to
develop. Finally, on the basis of the available evidence
about our ancestors, we 1ry to piece together a coherent
account of how these changes might have occurred
(Hockett, pp. 89-90).
The importance of the comparative method for the
construction of a textured, historical model of the
evolution oflanguage is not news to Sheets-Johnstone.
In her paper "Taking Evolution Seriously" she

Commentary:
The Nature and Evolution
of Human Language
Michael Bishop
Iowa State University
In "The Possibility of an Evolutionary Semantics"
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone levels two criticisms at
current philosophical and scientific practice. First, it
assumes or leads to ahistorical models of human
language. And second, it fails to acknowledge the
prevalence of iconic bodily representation in human and
nonhuman communication systems. My aim here is to
evaluate the legitimacy of these charges.
1. The origins of human language

According to Sheets-Johnstone, some scientists and
philosophers employ ahistorical models of human
communication, models that do not explain how or why
human language developed, but assume it "arose full
blown from the mouths of hominids like the goddess
Athena arose full-blown from the head ofZeus." Sheets
Johnstone believes that Charles Hockett is an exponent
of this "Athena-like paradigm" and that he gives himself
away when he defines language as something which
only humans can have: "it is because the beginning of
language is fixed at the start by definition that the
paradigm prevails. Only humans have language;
therefore language arose (and can only have arisen)
'with their kind.' "
Hockett, however, does not define "language" as
something which only humans can have. Hockett (1960)
adduces thirteen "design features" that a communication
system might possess and claims, "There is solid
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bodily representation. The issue is not whether humans
and nonhumans sometimes communicate in ways that
involve iconic bodily representations. They do. The
issue is whether the motor theory of speech perception
implies that iconic bodily representation is prevalent in
human language. I am skeptical because the paradigm
examples of iconic bodily representation involve three
core features, none of which are shared by human
language (or by many other forms of nonhuman
communication2).

compliments evolutionary scientists for employing it
to understand our ancestors' behavior. Yet Hockett
explicitly states that this is wbat he is doing: "With this
sort of comparative method it may be possible to
reconstruct the communicative habits of the remote
ancestors of the hominoid line" (p. 89). Once again,
Hockett's model may be inadequate, but it's not
abistorical.
2. Iconic bodily representation

(I) In the case of the honeybee and the howler monkey,

Sheets-Johnstone argues that current philosophical
and scientific practice fails to acknowledge the
prevalence oficonic bodily representation in human and
nonhuman communication systems. In human language,
this sort of representation (or something akin to it)
makes a number of appearances. I will focus on its
putative appearance in speech perception.
Sheets-Johnstone embraces the motor theory of
speech perception. This is a phonetic theory, i.e., a
theory that is supposed to tell us how we manage to
recognize a speech sound as being of one type rather
than another (such as a voiceless bilabial stop [the /p/
sound] or a glottal glide [the /hi sound]). One might
suppose that we perceive (and categorize) speech
sounds straightforwardly in terms of their acoustic
properties (the physical properties of sound waves).'
Proponents of the motor theory deny this. They maintain
that the categories we employ to identify types of speech
sound are defined in terms of types of articulation.
Given the motor theory of speech perception, Sheets
Johnstone argues that iconic bodily representation is
prevalent in both human and nonhuman commu
nication. Consider some paradigms of iconic bodily
representation. One is the honeybee's waggle dance, in
which a bee communicates the direction and distance
of a food source by engaging in a dance that is in part
"a miniaturized version of the flight from the hive to
the target" (Wtlson, p. 53). Another is the sexual display
of a female bowler monkey in estrus who invites
copulation by mirroring sexual intercourse with mouth
and tongue. Sheets-Jobnstoneclaims that in these cases
and in cases of human speech perception "the body is
iconically representing its own experiences and is thereby
communicating either its bodily dispositions of the
moment, or information about something in the world."
I think this is a misleading characterization of the
relationship that holds between human language and
Sheets-Johnstone's memorable examples of iconic
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the content of the message includes some kind of
physical activity, such as finding food or having sex.
In the case of human language, if I succeed in
recognizing speech sounds you make, then I have
(in some sense) acquired information about your
articulations (a physical activity). But information
about articulations is not part of the content ofyour
message (unless you are talking about your
articulations). For example, when you say, "John
hops," the content of your message does not involve
anything about your nasal cavity, teeth, lips, tongue,
palate, jaws or throat.
(2) In the case of iconic bodily representation, the
channel employed by the sender of a message is the
sender's own body. But in the relevant cases of
human language (those in which the perception of
speech is involved), speech is the channel of
communication.
(3)A third important feature of iconic bodily
representation is that the content of the message is
represented iconically; i.e., the sender's body
represents an activity by engaging in actions which
(in some way) resemble it. But when I say, "John
hops," the fact that makes this a representation of
John hopping is not that the former in any way
resembles the latter.
These are important asymmetries. There are others. 3
Even so, isn't there something right about what Sheets
Jobnstone says? Isn't there some sense in which she
has identified iconic bodily representation in human
language? Perhaps. If the motor theory is true, when
you hear me speak, part of your cognitive system is
busy employing information that somehow involves my
articulatory gestures. The relationship between the
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senders body and information employed by the receiver
thllt is not part ofthe content ofthe sender's message

tacit knowledge. It is not consciously accessible. (If it were,
evidence for the motor theory would be considerably easier
to acquire.) But when the female howler monkey invites a
potential mate to have sex. by employing tongue and mouth
as sexual analogues, the male's knowledge of the female's
bodily dispositions is altogether explicit. This is another
important asymmetry between the cases.

may be analogous to iconic bodily representation, or
even a case of it. The problem is that we cannot
confidently draw any such conclusions without a
clearer understanding of the nature of iconic bodily
representation and the various roles it can play in a
communication system.
As a final note, I would like to express some
cautionary counsel about how we should view the
relationship between human and nonhuman commu
nication that I think all parties to this debate can
embrace. Because human and nonhuman communication
is immensely variegated, general declarations of
similarity or dissimilarity are inherently suspect. So
once we recognize some specific similarities between
certain human and nonhuman communication systems,
we should avoid the temptation to force them into
uncomfortable conceptual categories that exaggerate
their affinities. And once we acknowledge some of the
differences between individual human and nonhuman
communication systems, we can and should avoid any
temptation to imagine that our linguistic abilities elevate
us above our evolutionary history or that the
communicative capacities of nonhumans inevitably
relegate them to their current moral status in society.4

4
I would like to thank Richard Combes, Susan Daniel.
Joe Mendola, and William Robinson for helpful comments
on earlier drafts ofthis paper.
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Notes
1
- Proponents of the motor theory point out that due to
differences in context, we can perceive acoustically identical
signals to be phonetically distinct, and we often perceive two
sounds to be phonetically identical even though they are
acoustically distinct (Liberman and Mattingly, pp. 14-6). They
conclude that we don't recognize speech sounds in terms of
the acoustic properties of those sounds.

2
There are many forms of nonhuman communication
which do not fit this model. To take just one example,
individual Atlantic bottlenosed dolphins have their own
signature whistles which allow other dolphins to identify them.
It appears that variations in the speed, loudness, and duration
of an individual dolphin's signature whistle inform (to some
degree) other dolphins about its state of excitement (Caldwell
& Caldwell, p. 796). The dolphins' communication is neither
bodily nor iconic nor does it (in any obvious sense) involve
the representation of physical activity.
3

In the case of human language, if the motor theory is
true, then the knowledge about the sender's body that is
employed by the receiver in categorizing speech sounds is
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